In this paper we deÿne and study some solution concepts for games in which there does not have to be total cooperation between the players. In particular, we show the relations of these solution concepts with the selectope. In this way, we extend the work of Derks, Haller and Peters, METEOR Research Memorandum, Maastricht, RM=97=016 (revised version, 1998).
Introduction
In game theory it is often assumed that either all players will cooperate or that the game will be played noncooperatively. However, there are many intermediate possibilities between universal cooperation and no cooperation. In this paper, we discuss a class of partial cooperation structures and develop a model of cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. This interesting idea was studied already in [12] and this line of research was continued by, among others, Owen [14] , van den Nouweland and Borm [13] , and Borm, Owen and Tijs [3] .
Faigle [8] and Faigle and Kern [9] proposed a model of partial cooperation by considering a family of feasible coalitions and deÿning a game on this family. In our model, we will deÿne the feasible coalitions by using combinatorial theory. The model of Faigle and Kern, and the classical model of a cooperative game are particular cases.
The central concept of the present paper is the selectope, ÿrst introduced in [11] . Brie y, the selectope contains all ways of distributing the so-called dividends of the coalitions between their members. Game theoretically, can be seen as imposing reasonable bounds on such distributions. Indeed, for a classical cooperative game the selectope is equal to the core of a game that arises by imposing on every coalition additionally the negative dividends of all coalitions in which members of the coalition under consideration participate. See [5] for further details.
Let us brie y outline the contents. We begin by introducing games deÿned on a family of subsets of a ÿnite set N and in this context, di erent solution concepts are considered. In the ÿrst section, we deÿne imputations, core and selectope for games deÿned on a family L ⊆ 2 N and we establish the relations between these solution concepts. If L=2
N we obtain a classical cooperative game. In this case, we know that the core of a game v is included in the selectope. However, this is not true when L = 2 N : In the third section, some conditions on the family L are imposed and we prove that under those conditions, the selectope contains the core of the game. To this end, closure spaces are introduced, and in particular, intersecting families. It turns out, roughly, that the latter structure of partial cooperation is necessary and su cient for the core to be always included in the selectope. Moreover, the concept of a closure space generalizes those partial cooperation structures where the set of feasible coalitions is closed under taking intersections.
In the last section, we deÿne convex geometries and describe some of their fundamental properties. The convex geometry structure generalizes many forms of partial cooperation studied in the literature, as we will show by means of examples. Moreover, it facilitates the extension of the deÿnition of marginal worth vectors to games with partial cooperation because the role of permutations of the player set in this deÿnition is played by maximal chains. We introduce the Weber set as the convex hull of the marginal worth vectors, and we show that for games on convex geometries the Weber set is contained in the selectope. In classical cooperative games the Weber set plays a role as a core catcher. Moreover, for the important class of convex games it coincides with the core and, thus, implies a simple (greedy) algorithm to compute core elements. Here, as we will see, it singles out distributions according to consistent selectors from the selectope.
Solution concepts for games with partial cooperation
In this section we consider cooperative games in which there is a restriction on the formation of coalitions; the collection of feasible coalitions is denoted by L: If we denote the set of players by N = {1; : : : ; n}, then L ⊆ 2 N and we only assume that ∅; N ∈ L throughout the paper. When {i} ∈ L for all i ∈ N; the family L is called atomic. Sometimes, additional conditions are required on L. The interpretation is that only the feasible coalitions are worthwhile in the game. A game on L is a function
We denote by (L) the set of all games deÿned on the family L. The set (L) is a vector space over R, and there is a collection of games which deserves special consideration because it is a basis of (L): These unanimity games are deÿned for any nonempty T ∈ L; and denoted by T : L → {0; 1}; where
To show linear independence of the collection of unanimity games is left as an easy exercise to the reader; the spanning property is then obvious, and the associated coe cients play a major role in this paper and are derived below.
One of the main topics dealt with in cooperative game theory, is to divide the amount v(N ) between the players if the grand coalition N is formed. The solution concepts that we study will prescribe distributions of the worth v(N ) among the players. Let v : L → R be a game on L. For x ∈ R n and S ⊆ N deÿne x(S)= i∈S x i , with x(∅)=0. We introduce the following solution concepts. The set of preimputations of the game v: L → R is the set
and the imputation set is given by
The core of the game v is the set
Note that the core of v is a polyhedron that is not necessarily bounded. However, if the family L is atomic then the core is a polytope. Hammer et al. [11] introduced another solution concept which was called selectope. This solution concept was investigated by Derks et al. [5] in the case of cooperative games. We extend it for games deÿned on an atomic family of feasible coalitions L.
First of all, we deÿne the dividends for the game v ∈ (L); recursively, by
and hence every v ∈ (L) can be uniquely represented by
where T ∈ (L) is the unanimity game for the nonempty coalition T ∈ L: 
We denote by A(L) the set of all selectors on L: Note that the number of selectors on L is T ∈L;T =∅ |T |:
Obviously, for every v ∈ (L); and ∈ A(L); we have m (v) ∈ I * (L; v) and hence, by convexity of
Example. Let N = {1; 2; 3} and consider the family L = {∅; {1}; {2}; {3}; {1; 2}; {1; 2; 3}}:
and v(123) = 3: There are six selectors on L which are listed in Table 1 Table 2 {1; 2}
and the game v ∈ (L) deÿned, for every S ∈ L\{∅}; by
If we calculate the dividends of the game, we get
and we show the selections in following Table 2 .
On the other hand, Core(L; v) is the set of vectors x ∈ R 4 such that
x 2 + x 3 ¿2;
as it cannot be written as convex combination of m (v) with ∈ A(L), because Table 2 ). 
N be an atomic family with ∅; N ∈ L and let v ∈ (L): The following statements are equivalent:
For (c) ⇒ (a), let v be an almost positive game. We assert that m (v) ∈ Core(L; v) for every selector . Indeed, for every nonempty coalition S ∈ L, we have
where the inequality follows because all dividends of the non-unitary coalitions are nonnegative.
Although Core(L; v) ⊆ Sel(L; v) has already been proved by Hammer et al. [11] in the case L = 2 N , this result is not true when the family of the feasible coalitions
N with N = {1; 2; 3; 4} and ∅; N; {1; 2}; {2; 3}; {i} ∈ L for all i ∈ N , and the almost positive game v with v({1; 2}) = v({2; 3}) = 1, v(N ) = 4, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Then it is easily checked that (0; 1; 0; 3) ∈ Core(L; v), whereas player 4 obtains at most v (N ) = 2 in the selectope.
The inclusion Core(L; v) ⊆ Sel(L; v) is true if we consider the family L with some additional conditions, as established in the next section.
Games on closure spaces
We now introduce a certain class of families of feasible coalitions. A family L of subsets of N with the properties
is called a closure space on N . The elements of a closure space are called closed sets. When L is a closure space on N ordered by inclusion, it is a complete lattice.
Two special cases of closure spaces are intersecting families and convex geometries. Convex geometries will be deÿned in the next section.
The closure space L is called an intersecting family when
Note that all the closure spaces on N = {1; 2; 3} are intersecting families. In order to prove the next theorem, it is necessary to ÿrst deÿne some concepts. Let L ⊆ 2 N be an atomic intersecting family and let S ⊆ N . We consider the set of all closed sets of L contained in S; i.e.,
If we consider L S ordered by inclusion, then (L S ; ⊆) is a ÿnite partially ordered set where the ÿrst element is ∅. Let L (S) be the set of all maximal elements of (L S ; ⊆). Every one of these elements is called a maximal closed set of S. Under these conditions we have the following property. Proof. Note that if S ∈ L, then L (S)={S} and therefore, the proposition is trivially true. If S ∈ L and we write L (S) = {S 1 ; : : : ; S k }; then k¿2 and
In order to prove that the coalitions in L (S) form a partition of S; we claim that S i ∩ S j = ∅ for all 16i; j6k; i = j. Indeed, if S i ∩ S j = ∅; then S i ∪ S j ∈ L since L is an intersecting family and also S i ∪ S j ⊆ S; and hence S i ∪ S j ∈ L S but this is a contradiction because S i and S j are maximal closed sets of S. where the inequality follows because x ∈ Core(L; v), the y i j are nonincreasing, and by Proposition 2, and the before last equality also follows by Proposition 2. Obviously, it is su cient to take the selector ∈ A(L) such that It should be noted that the proof of Theorem 3 is closely related to the proof in [4] of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set for games on 2 N . See also Section 4 below.
There is also a converse to Theorem 3.
Proof. Suppose L is not an intersecting family. Then there are S; T ∈ L with S ∩T = ∅ but S ∪ T ∈ L. Let the number of players in N \(S ∪ T ) be equal to
, and v(M ) = 0 otherwise. Then the dividends of S and T are equal to 1, the dividend of N is equal to k − 1, and all other dividends are equal to 0. Fix a player i ∈ S ∩T . Then it is easily seen that the vector x with x i =1, x j =1 for all j ∈ N \(S ∪T ), and x j = 0 otherwise, is a core element. In this core element the players outside S ∪ T receive k together. In the selectope, however, they receive at most the dividend k − 1 of N together. Hence, the core is not contained in the selectope. (Observe that in this example it is indeed essential that S ∪ T ∈ L, because otherwise x as above would not be a core element.)
As has already been indicated, the game v ∈ (L) can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games, where the coe cients are the dividends of the coalitions in L. So, if we consider
then we have the decomposition v = v 
In order to prove the converse inclusion it is, in view of part (a), su cient to prove that for any two selectors ; ÿ ∈ A(L), we have
for every nonempty S ∈ L, and thus
Note that if family L is an atomic family such that ∅, N ∈ L; but not necessarily an intersecting family, then the assertions in this theorem hold only with ⊆ instead of =.
Games on convex geometries
In this section, we deÿne the concept of convex geometry (see [6] ) and we describe some of their fundamental properties. We introduce the Weber set for games on convex geometries and investigate its relation with the selectope. A closure space L is a convex geometry on N if it satisÿes the one-player extension property, i.e., If A = N is a closed set, then A ∪ {i} is closed for some i ∈ N \A.
An element in a convex geometry L is called convex set. For A ⊆ N; an element a ∈ A is an extreme point of A if a ∈ A\a. (Here, B is the smallest element of L containing B ⊆ N . This is well deÿned because L is closed under taking intersections.) For a closed set A ∈ L this is equivalent to A\a ∈ L. Moreover, for A; B ∈ L with B ⊆ A, any extreme point of A belonging to B is also an extreme point of B. Let ex(A) be the set of all extreme points of A. The convex geometries are the abstract closure spaces satisfying the ÿnite Minkowski-Krein-Milman property: Every closed set is the closure of its extreme points [6] . The following result shows that convex geometries have some properties of Euclidean convexity. (c) For every closed set C ⊆ N; C = ex(C).
Proof. See [6, Theorem 2:1].
We give some examples which exhibit how convex geometries have already arisen in other papers on games with partial cooperation. Example. A subset S of a poset (partially ordered set) (P; 6) is convex whenever a ∈ S; b ∈ S and a6b imply [a; b] ⊆ S. The convex subsets of any poset P form a closure system Co(P). If P (or, equivalently Co(P)) is ÿnite, then each element is between a maximal and a minimal one. If C ∈ Co(P) then ex(C) is the union of the maximal and minimal elements of C. Moreover, Co(P) is a convex geometry [2, Theorem 3]. Edelman [7] studies voting games such that the feasible coalitions are the convex sets in Co(P), where (P; 6) is the chain deÿned by the policy order (see Fig. 2 ).
Example. A graph G = (N; E) is connected if any two vertices can be joined by a path. A maximal connected subgraph of G is a component of G. A cutvertex is one whose removal increases the number of components, and a bridge is an edge with the same property. A graph is 2-connected if it is connected, has at least 3 vertices and contains no cutvertex. A subgraph B of a graph G is a block of G if either B is a bridge or else it is a maximal 2-connected subgraph of G. A graph G is a block graph if every block is a complete graph. The block graphs are called cycle-complete graphs in [13] .
A communication situation is a triple (N; G; v), where (N; v) is a game and G = (N; E) is a graph. This concept was ÿrst introduced in [12] , and investigated in [3] . If G = (N; E) is a connected block-graph, then the family of all coalitions of N that induce connected subgraph
is a convex geometry [6, Theorem 3:7] .
Example. Let (P; 6) be a poset (with, as usual in this paper, P ÿnite). For any X ⊆ P; X → X :={y ∈ P: y6x for some x ∈ X }; deÿnes a closure operator on P. Its closed sets are the order ideals (down sets) of P, and we denote this lattice by J (P). Since the union and intersection of order ideals is again an order ideal, it follows that J (P) is a sublattice of 2 P . Then J (P) is a distributive lattice and so, J (P) is a convex geometry closed under set-union and ex(S) is the set of all maximal points Max(S) of the subposet S ∈ J (P). There is a 1-1 correspondence between antichains of P and order ideals. The games (C; v) and (A; c) of Faigle and Kern [9, 10] , where C is the family of down sets of P and A is the set of antichains of P, are games on distributive lattices.
Edelman and Jamison deÿned a compatible ordering of a convex geometry L ⊆ 2 N as a total ordering of the elements of N , i 1 ¡ i 2 ¡ · · · ¡ i n such that {i 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i k } ∈ L for all 16k6n:
A compatible ordering of L corresponds to a maximal chain of L. Here, a maximal chain C of L is an ordered collection of convex sets
We denote by C(L) the set of all maximal chains of L. Note that if L = 2 N ; then there are n! maximal chains.
Thus, in every maximal chain of L, there is a minimal convex set that contains a player i. Moreover, i is extreme in this convex set. Thus, for every i ∈ N and C ∈ C(L); we denote by C(i) the minimal convex set in chain C which contains player i; i.e., C(i) = {j ∈ N : j6i in the chain C}:
In other words, C(i) is the set of the predecessors of player i with respect to chain C together with player i. It is clear that i ∈ ex(C(i)) since
Let L be a convex geometry on N , C ∈ C(L) and v ∈ (L). The marginal worth vector with respect to chain C in game v is the vector a C (v) ∈ R N given by
and the Weber set is deÿned by
For an atomic convex geometry L on N we will investigate the relation between the Weber set and the selectope. The following result establishes connections between selections corresponding to selectors on L and the marginal worth vectors associated with the maximal chains of L.
Proposition 7. Let C ∈ C(L) be a maximal chain and let : L\{∅} → N be deÿned for every nonempty coalition S ∈ L; by (S) = j where j ∈ S and S ⊆ C(j):
Then is a selector and
Proof. First of all, we prove that is well deÿned. For every nonempty coalition S ∈ L; it is clear that there exists a unique j ∈ S such that S ⊆ C(j). Here, j is the last element of S that is incorporated in the maximal chain C; i.e., this element j ∈ S is such that C(k) ⊆ C(j) for all k ∈ S. Moreover, j ∈ ex(S) since
Therefore, is well deÿned. Now, for every i ∈ N and v ∈ (L), we have
As the selectope for game v ∈ (L) is a convex set, one consequence of this Proposition is that Weber(L; v) ⊆ Sel(L; v).
In order to prove a converse of Proposition 7, we have to impose a condition on the selector. 
For all S; T ∈ L, if S ⊂ T and (T ) ∈ S, then (S) = (T ).
Note that if we take a maximal chain C ∈ C(L) and we deÿne the selector as in the above proposition, then is consistent. Moreover, di erent chains correspond to di erent selectors. Proof. First of all, note that for every unanimity game S ∈ (L), we have S (S) = 1 and
because { T : T ∈ L; T = ∅} is a basis of (L) and, for every v ∈ (L), we have
. We assert that is consistent. In order to prove the ÿrst condition of consistency, we consider the unanimity game T ∈ (L). If (T ) = i, we have
Hence, T ⊆ C(i) but T * C(i)\i, i.e., i is the last element of T in the order of C. So (T ) ∈ T and T ⊆ C( (T )), and thus (T ) ∈ ex(T ) because (T ) ∈ ex(C( (T ))). Now, we prove the second condition of consistency. Let S ⊂ T and (T ) = i with i ∈ S. Since i ∈ ex(T ) and S ⊂ T we have i ∈ ex(S). Then S ⊂ C(i) since T ⊆ C(i) and we have Note that N; N \{i n }; : : : ; N \{i n ; i n−1 ; : : : i k+1 } ∈ L because is consistent. Moreover, the selector coincides with the selector deÿned in Proposition 7 for this chain, i.e., if ÿ ∈ A(L) is such that for all S ∈ L; S = ∅, ÿ(S) = j where j ∈ S and S ⊆ C(j); then = ÿ. Indeed, it is clear that (S) = ÿ(S) for every nonempty coalition S ∈ C; if S = ∈ C then ÿ(S) = i ∈ ex(S) and S ⊂ C(i) where C(i) is the least convex set in the chain that contains i. Since S ⊂ C(i) and (C(i)) = i ∈ ex(S), the consistency of the selector implies that (S) = i. Thus ÿ(S) = (S) for every nonempty coalition S ∈ L.
Applying Proposition 7 for the selector , we obtain a C (v) = m (v) for every v ∈ (L).
In order to prove that chain C is the unique chain such that a C (v) = m (v) for all v ∈ (L), we consider the unanimity game N ∈ (L). For every j ∈ N; we have Note that if C(j) ⊇ N \{i n } and C(j)\j + N \{i n }; then C(j) is a convex set with n or n − 1 elements, but in every maximal chain there is only one convex set with k elements, for all 16k6n; and the convex set of n elements is excluded. Therefore, Thus, since (N \{i n })=i n−1 , we have a C ( N \{i n } )=m ( N \{i n } ) if and only if C(i n−1 )= N \{i n }. By repeating this argument, the maximal chain C is obtained.
Example. Let N = {1; 2; 3} and consider the convex geometry L = {∅; {1}; {2}; {3}; {1; 2}; {2; 3}; {1; 2; 3}}
